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Abstract
In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait’s success is its fixation probability—
the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribu-
tion. This fixation probability is difficult to compute in general, as it depends on the mutation’s
effect on the organism as well as the population’s spatial structure, mating patterns, and other
factors. Here we consider weak selection, meaning the mutation’s effect on the organism is
small. We obtain a weak-selection perturbation expansion of a mutant’s fixation probability,
from an arbitrary initial configuration of mutant and resident types. Our results apply to a
broad class of stochastic evolutionary models, in which spatial structure is arbitrary, but fixed.
The problem of whether selection favors a given trait is thereby reduced from exponential to
polynomial complexity in the population size, when selection is weak. We apply method to
obtain new results for well-studied models of evolutionary dynamics on graphs.
1 Introduction
Many studies of stochastic evolutionary dynamics concern the competition of two types (traits)
in a finite population. Through a series of births and deaths, the composition of the population
changes over time. Absent recurring mutation, one of the two types will eventually become fixed
and the other will go extinct. Such models may incorporate frequency-dependent selection as well
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as spatial structure or other forms of population structure. The fundamental question is to identify
the selective differences that favor the fixation of one type over the other.
This question is typically answered by computing a trait’s fixation probability (Haldane, 1927;
Moran, 1958; Kimura, 1962; Patwa and Wahl, 2008; Traulsen and Hauert, 2010; Der et al., 2011;
Hindersin and Traulsen, 2014; McCandlish et al., 2015; Hindersin et al., 2016) as a function of
the initial configuration of the two types. Direct calculation of fixation probability is possible in
simple models of well-mixed populations (Moran, 1958; Taylor et al., 2004) or spatially structured
populations that are highly symmetric (Lieberman et al., 2005; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2008; Hin-
dersin and Traulsen, 2014) or small (Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015; Cuesta et al., 2018; Mo¨ller
et al., 2019; Tkadlec et al., 2019). Outside of these cases, fixation probability can be approximated
using diffusion approximations (Kimura, 1962; Ohtsuki et al., 2006) and/or perturbative methods
for weak selection (Haldane, 1927; Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2007; Lessard and Ladret,
2007), which are often paired with methods from coalescent theory (Rousset, 2003; Chen, 2013;
Van Cleve, 2015; Chen et al., 2016; Allen et al., 2017, 2020).
Our aim in this work is to generalize the weak-selection method for computing fixation prob-
ability to a broad class of evolutionary models. Our main result is a first-order weak-selection
expansion of fixation probability from any initial condition. This result applies to arbitrary forms
of spatial structure and frequency-dependent selection. This expansion can be computed for any
particular model and initial configuration by solving a system of linear equations. Under condi-
tions that apply to most models of interest, the size of this system—and hence the complexity of
computing this expansion—grows polynomially with the population size.
Our approach is based on a modeling framework, developed by Allen and Tarnita (2014) and
Allen and McAvoy (2019), which is described in Section 2. This framework describes stochastic
trait transmission in a population of fixed size and spatial structure. This setup leads to a finite
Markov chain model of selection. Special cases of this framework include the Moran (Moran,
1958) and Wright-Fisher models (Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931; Imhof and Nowak, 2006), as well as
evolutionary games in graph-structured populations (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007;
Nowak et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2017). We use this framework to define the degree of an evolu-
tionary process, which later plays an important role in determining the computational complexity
of calculating fixation probabilities.
In Section 3, we establish a connection between sojourn times and stationary probabilities.
Specifically, we compare the original Markov chain, which is absorbing, to an amended Markov
chain, in which the initial configuration ξ can be re-established from the all-A and all-B states
with some probability, u. This amended Markov chain is recurrent, and it has a unique stationary
distribution. We show that sojourn times for transient states of the original Markov chain are equal
to u-derivatives, at u = 0, of stationary probabilities in the amended chain. We also define a
set-valued coalescent process that is used in the proof of our main results.
Section 4 proves our main result regarding fixation probability. We consider the fixation prob-
ability, ρA (ξ), of type A in a population whose initial configuration of A and B is ξ. The intensity
of selection, δ, which quantifies selective differences between the two types, is assumed to be suf-
ficiently weak, meaning δ 1. Our main result is a formula for calculating ρA (ξ) to first order in
the selection intensity δ. This formula depends on the first-order effects of selection on marginal
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trait-transmission probabilities together with a set of sojourn times for neutral drift. The latter can
be evaluated by solving a linear system of size O
(
N`+1
)
, where ` is the degree of the process.
This linear system is what bounds the complexity in N of calculating the first-order coefficient,
d
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρA (ξ).
In Section 5, we extend our main result to the case that the initial configuration of A and B
is stochastic rather than deterministic. We derive a formula for ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA [ρA], where µA is an
arbitrary distribution over initial configurations of A and B (and which can also depend on δ).
Section 6 considers relative measures of evolutionary success (Tarnita and Taylor, 2014) obtained
by comparing EµA [ρA] to EµB [ρB] when A and B each have their own initial distributions, µA
and µB.
Finally, we apply our results to well-known questions in evolutionary dynamics, particularly
on graph-structured populations. Section 7 discusses the case of constant fecundity, wherein the
reproductive rate of an individual depends only on its own type. A large body of research (Lieber-
man et al., 2005; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2008; Broom et al., 2011; Voorhees, 2013; Monk et al.,
2014; Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015; Kaveh et al., 2015; Cuesta et al., 2017; Pavlogiannis et al.,
2018; Mo¨ller et al., 2019; Tkadlec et al., 2019) aims to understand the effects of graph structure on
fixation probability in this context. Our results provide efficient recipes to calculate this fixation
probability under weak selection. Section 8 turns to evolutionary game theory. For a particular
prisoner’s dilemma game (the “donation game”; Sigmund, 2010), we derive a formula for the fix-
ation probability of cooperation from any starting configuration on an arbitrary weighted graph,
generalizing and unifying a number of earlier results (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007;
Chen, 2013; Allen and Nowak, 2014; Chen et al., 2016; Allen et al., 2017).
2 Modeling evolutionary dynamics
We employ a framework previously developed by Allen and Tarnita (2014) and Allen and McAvoy
(2019) to represent an evolving population with arbitrary forms of spatial structure and frequency
dependence. Although we will use the language of a haploid asexual population, our formalism
applies equally well to diploid, haplodiploid, or other populations by considering the alleles to
be asexual replicators (the “gene’s-eye view”). This approach is formalized using the notion of
genetic sites developed in Allen and McAvoy (2019).
2.1 Modeling assumptions
We consider competition between two alleles, A and B, in a population of finite size, N. The state
of the population is given by x ∈ {0, 1}N, where xi = 1 (resp. xi = 0) indicates that individual i
has type A (resp. B).
The population’s state is updated in discrete time steps via replacement events. A replacement
event is a pair, (R, α), where R ⊆ {1, . . . ,N} is the set of individuals who are replaced in a given
time step and α : R → {1, . . . ,N} is the offspring-to-parent map. For a fixed replacement event,
(R, α), the state of the population at time t+ 1, xt+1, is obtained from the state of the population
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at time t, xt, by letting
xt+1i =

xtα(i) i ∈ R,
xti i 6∈ R.
(1)
We can express such a transition more concisely by defining the extended mapping α˜ : {1, . . . ,N} →
{1, . . . ,N} with α˜ (j) = α (j) if j ∈ R and α˜ (j) = j if j 6∈ R. We then have xt+1 = xtα˜, where xα˜
is the vector whose ith component is xα˜(i).
In state x, we denote by
{
p(R,α) (x)
}
(R,α)
the distribution from which the replacement event
is chosen. We call this distribution (as a function of x) the replacement rule. We assume that
this replacement rule depends on an underlying parameter δ > 0 that represents the intensity of
selection. Neutral drift corresponds to δ = 0, and weak selection is the regime δ 1.
We make three assumptions on the replacement rule. The first is that for every δ, there exists
at least one individual who can generate a lineage that takes over the entire population. We state
this assumption as an axiom:
Fixation Axiom. There exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, m > 1, and a sequence {(Rk, αk)}mk=1 with
• p(Rk,αk) (x) > 0 for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and x ∈ {0, 1}N;
• i ∈ Rk for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m};
• for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, we have α˜1 ◦ α˜2 ◦ · · · ◦ α˜m (j) = i.
Our second assumption is that when δ = 0 (neutral drift), the replacement rule does not depend
on the state, x. In this case, we denote the replacement rule by
{
p◦(R,α)
}
(R,α)
; note that we have
removed the dependence on x. This assumption arises because, under neutral drift, the competing
alleles are interchangeable, and so the probabilities of replacement should not depend on how these
alleles are distributed among individuals.
Our third assumption is that for every x ∈ {0, 1}N and every replacement event (R, α),
p(R,α) (x) is a smooth function of δ in a small neighborhood of δ = 0. This assumption enables a
perturbation expansion in the selection strength, δ.
For brevity we denote B := {0, 1}. Each replacement rule defines a Markov chain on BN,
according to Eq. (1). We let Px→y the probability of transitioning from state x to state y in this
Markov chain.
Allen and Tarnita (2014) showed that, under the Fixation Axiom, this Markov chain has two
absorbing states: the state A be in which xi = 1 for every i (all-A), and the state B in which
xi = 0 for every i (all-B). All other states are transient. We denote the set of all transient states by
BNᵀ := BN − {A,B}.
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2.2 Quantifying selection
Having outlined the class of models under consideration, we now define quantities that characterize
natural selection in a given population state x ∈ BN. For any i and j, let eij (x) be the marginal
probability that i transmits its offspring to j in state x, i.e.
eij (x) := ∑
(R,α)
j∈R, α(j)=i
p(R,α) (x) . (2)
The birth rate (expected offspring number) of i is bi (x) := ∑Nj=1 eij (x) and the death probability
of i is di (x) := ∑Nj=1 eji (x).
Any real-valued function on BN is called a pseudo-Boolean function (Hammer and Rudeanu,
1968). Since eij (x) and its derivative with respect to δ at δ = 0 are pseudo-Boolean functions,
for every i and j there is a unique multi-linear polynomial representation (Hammer and Rudeanu,
1968; Boros and Hammer, 2002),
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
eij (x) = ∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
cijI xI , (3)
where the cijI are a collection of real numbers indexed by the subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . ,N}, and xI :=
∏i∈I xi. Note that xI = 1 if and only if xi = 1 for each i ∈ I. We let `ij denote the degree of the
above representation, i.e.
`ij := max
{
k : cijI 6= 0 for some I ⊆ {1, . . . ,N} with |I| = k
}
. (4)
(In the trivial case that cijI = 0 for every I ⊆ {1, . . . ,N}, we set `ij = 0.)
For I ⊆ {1, . . . ,N}, let 1I ∈ BN denote the state in which xi = 1 for i ∈ I and xi = 0
for i 6∈ I. By applying a Mo¨bius transform to Eq. (3) (Grabisch et al., 2000), we can express the
coefficients cijI as
cijI =
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∑
J⊆I
(−1)|I|−|J| eij (1J) , (5)
This provides a recipe for calculating the coefficients cijI directly for a given process (see Section 8).
We define the degree of the overall evolutionary process, under weak selection, to be maximal
degree in Eq. (3) as i and j run over all pairs of sites:
Definition 1. The degree of the process under weak selection is ` := max16i,j6N `ij.
We turn now to fixation probabilities. For ξ ∈ BN, let ρA (ξ) (resp. ρB (ξ)) be the probability
that the state A (resp. B) is eventually reached after starting in state ξ. Since states A and B are
absorbing and all other states are transient, we have ρB (ξ) = 1− ρA (ξ) for each ξ ∈ BN.
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In the case of neutral drift (δ = 0), we let pii be the probability of fixation for type A when
starting from state 1{i}; that is, pii = ρA
(
1{i}
)
when δ = 0. Equivalently, pii is the probability,
under neutral drift, that i is eventually the ancestor of the entire population. These site-specific
fixation probabilities are the unique solution to the system of equations (Allen et al., 2015, Theorem
2; Allen and McAvoy, 2019, Theorem 7)
N
∑
j=1
e◦ijpij =
N
∑
j=1
e◦jipii; (6a)
N
∑
i=1
pii = 1. (6b)
The quantity pii can be interpreted as the reproductive value (RV) of site i (Fisher, 1930; Taylor,
1990; Maciejewski, 2014; Allen and McAvoy, 2019), in that it quantifies the expected contribution
of site i to the future gene pool, under neutral drift. For any state x ∈ BN, the RV-weighed fre-
quency, x̂ := ∑Ni=1 piixi, is equal to the probability that A becomes fixed under neutral drift when
the process starts in state x (Allen and McAvoy, 2019, Theorem 7). Reproductive value provides a
natural weighting for quantities characterizing selection; for example, we define the RV-weighted
birth rates and death probabilities to be b̂i (x) := ∑Nj=1 eij (x)pij and d̂i (x) := ∑
N
j=1 eji (x)pii, re-
spectively. The change in reproductive-value-weighted frequency of A due to selection is (Tarnita
and Taylor, 2014; Allen and McAvoy, 2019)
∆̂sel (x) :=
N
∑
i=1
xi
(
b̂i (x)− d̂i (x)
)
=
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
(
xj − xi
)
eji (x) . (7)
Since b̂◦i = d̂
◦
i for i = 1, . . . ,N, it follows that ∆̂
◦
sel (x) = 0 for every x ∈ BN.
3 Stationary distributions, sojourn times, and coalescence
We are ultimately interested in quantifying (to first order in δ) the probability ρA(ξ) that type A
reaches fixation from initial state ξ. To achieve this, we will need to quantify the frequency with
which the Markov chain visits a given state x ∈ BN prior to absorption in state A or B. We will
quantify this in two ways: using sojourn times and using the stationary distribution of an amended
Markov chain. These two notions are closely connected, as we prove in Proposition 1 below.
We define the sojourn time tξ (x), for x ∈ BN, to be the expected number of visits to x prior to
hitting {A,B} when the process begins in state ξ ∈ BNᵀ . These sojourn times tξ (x) are uniquely
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determined by the recurrence
tξ (x) =

0 x ∈ {A,B} ,
1+ ∑
y∈BN
tξ (y) Py→x x = ξ,
∑
y∈BN
tξ (y) Py→x x 6∈ {A,B, ξ} .
(8)
Since the transition probabilities are continuously differentiable in δ in a neighborhood of δ =
0, so is tξ (x).
It is also helpful to consider an amended Markov chain that can “reset” in state ξ after one of
the monoallelic states, A or B, is reached. We introduce a new parameter u > 0, and define, for
x, y ∈ BN, the amended transition probabilities
P(ξ)x→y :=

u x ∈ {A,B} , y = ξ,
(1− u) Px→y x ∈ {A,B} , y 6= ξ,
Px→y x 6∈ {A,B} .
(9)
Above, Px→y refers to the transition probability in the original Markov chain. Thus the amended
chain has the same transition probabilities except that, from either of the monoallelic states A
or B, there is probability u to transition to state ξ (see Fig. 1). The amended chain is clearly
aperiodic, and it follows from the Fixation Axiom that it has a single closed communicating class,
and all states not in this class are transient. The amended chain therefore has a unique stationary
distribution, which we denote by {pi(ξ)(x)}x∈BN , the notation  (ξ) indicating regeneration in
state ξ.
In the limit of rare mutation, the amended Markov chain gives an embedded Markov chain on
the absorbing states, with transition matrix
Λ :=
( A B
A ρA (ξ) ρB (ξ)
B ρA (ξ) ρB (ξ)
)
. (10)
The stationary distribution of the embedded chain coincides with the low-mutation limit of pi(ξ)
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𝜌! 𝝃
𝜌" 𝝃
𝑢
𝑢
state 𝝃
state 𝐀 (all-𝐴)
state 𝐁 (all-𝐵)
1 − 𝑢
1 − 𝑢
Figure 1: Transitions into a fixed transient state, ξ, following absorption. When starting from a non-monomorphic
state, the process will eventually reach one of the two absorbing states (all-A or all-B) by the Fixation Axiom. From
each absorbing state, the process transitions to ξ with probability u > 0. This “artificial” mutation allows one to focus
on the fixation probability when the process is started in a fixed initial configuration, ξ, of A and B.
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on the absorbing states (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006, Theorem 2); that is,
lim
u→0
pi(ξ) (x) =

ρA (ξ) x = A,
ρB (ξ) x = B,
0 x 6∈ {A,B} .
(11)
The following result, which is key to our methodology, shows that sojourn times of the original
chain coincide with the u-derivative, at u = 0, of the stationary distribution for the amended chain:
Proposition 1. For every non-monoallelic state x ∈ BNᵀ ,
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
pi(ξ) (x) = tξ (x) . (12)
Proof. For x ∈ BNᵀ , stationarity implies
pi(ξ) (x) = ∑
y∈BN
pi(ξ) (y) P
(ξ)
y→x
= ∑
y∈BNᵀ
pi(ξ) (y) Py→x + uδξ,x
(
pi(ξ) (A) + pi(ξ) (B)
)
, (13)
where the Kronecker symbol δx,ξ is equal to 1 if x = ξ and 0 otherwise. Taking the u-derivative
at u = 0, and noting that limu→0
(
pi(ξ) (A) + pi(ξ) (B)
)
= 1 by Eq. (11), we obtain
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
pi(ξ) (x) = ∑
y∈BNᵀ
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
pi(ξ) (y) Py→x + δξ,x. (14)
We observe that ddu
∣∣∣
u=0
pi(ξ) (x) satisfies the same recurrence, Eq. (8), as tξ (x). Since this
recurrence uniquely defines the tξ (x), we have Eq. (12).
It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that tξ
(
BNᵀ
)
, the expected time to absorption when
starting from state ξ, is equal to limu→0 pi(ξ)
(
BNᵀ
)
/u. Another consequence is the following:
Corollary 1. For any function ϕ : BN → R with ϕ (A) = ϕ (B) = 0,
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
E(ξ) [ϕ] =
∞
∑
t=0
E
[
ϕ
(
xt
) | x0 = ξ] , (15)
and the sum on the right-hand side converges absolutely.
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Proof. ∑∞t=0
∣∣E [ϕ (xt) | x0 = ξ]∣∣ is bounded by tξ (BNᵀ ) (maxx∈BNᵀ |ϕ (x)|), so the right-hand
side of Eq. (15) converges absolutely. We may therefore rearrange this summation to obtain
∞
∑
t=0
E
[
ϕ
(
xt
) | x0 = ξ] = ∞∑
t=0
∑
x∈BNᵀ
P
[
xt = x | x0 = ξ
]
ϕ (x)
= ∑
x∈BNᵀ
ϕ (x)
∞
∑
t=0
∑
x∈BNᵀ
P
[
xt = x | x0 = ξ
]
= ∑
x∈BNᵀ
ϕ (x) tξ (x)
=
d
du
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
E(ξ) [ϕ] , (16)
as desired.
In light of Corollary 1, we define the operator 〈 〉ξ, acting on state functions ϕ : BN → R with
ϕ (A) = ϕ (B) = 0, by
〈ϕ〉ξ := ddu
∣∣∣∣∣
u=0
E(ξ) [ϕ] =
∞
∑
t=0
E
[
ϕ(xt) | x0 = ξ
]
. (17)
We will use the notation 〈 〉◦ξ to indicate that the above expectations are taken under neutral drift
(δ = 0).
For any function ϕ : BN → R and any α˜ : {1, . . . ,N} → {1, . . . ,N}, we define ϕα˜ : BN →
R by ϕα˜ (x) = ϕ (xα˜). If ϕ (A) = ϕ (B) = 0, then
〈ϕ〉◦ξ = ϕ (ξ) +
∞
∑
t=0
E◦
[
ϕ(xt+1) | x0 = ξ
]
= ϕ (ξ) +
∞
∑
t=0
∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)E
◦
[
ϕ
(
xtα˜
) | x0 = ξ]
= ϕ (ξ) + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α) 〈ϕα˜〉◦ξ , (18)
which gives the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For any state function ϕ : BN → R with ϕ (A) = ϕ (B) = 0,
〈ϕ〉◦ξ = ϕ (ξ) + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α) 〈ϕα˜〉◦ξ . (19)
Allen and McAvoy (2019) introduced the rare-mutation conditional (RMC) distribution, de-
fined as for a state x as limu→0P(ξ)
[
X = x | x ∈ BNᵀ
]
. Here we show that this distribution can
be equated to the fraction of time spent in state x out of all transient states:
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Corollary 2. For each x ∈ BNᵀ
lim
u→0
P(ξ)
[
X = x | x ∈ BNᵀ
]
=
tξ (x)
tξ
(
BNᵀ
) . (20)
Proof. For x ∈ BNᵀ ,
lim
u→0
P(ξ)
[
X = x | x ∈ BNᵀ
]
= lim
u→0
pi(ξ) (x)
pi(ξ)
(
BNᵀ
)
=
limu→0 pi(ξ) (x) /u
limu→0 pi(ξ)
(
BNᵀ
)
/u
=
tξ (x)
tξ
(
BNᵀ
) , (21)
by Proposition 1.
Finally, we introduce a set-valued Markov chain that will be used in the proof of our main result.
The states of this Markov chain are subsets of {1, . . . ,N}. From a given state I ⊆ {1, . . . ,N}, a
new state I′ is determined by choosing a replacement event (R, α) according to the neutral proba-
bilities p◦(R,α), and setting I
′ = α˜(I). This Markov chain, which we denote C, can be understood
as a coalescent process (Kingman, 1982; Liggett, 1985; Cox, 1989; Wakeley, 2016). At each time-
step, C transitions from a set of individuals I ⊆ {1, . . . ,N} to the set α˜(I) of parents of these
individuals. (In the case that an individual i ∈ I is not replaced, the “parent” is i itself; that is,
α˜(i) = i.) Thus, the state of the process after t steps can be understood as the set of ancestors of
the current population, at time t before the present.
By the Fixation Axiom, C has a single closed communicating class consisting only of single-
ton subsets. (In biological terms, the population’s ancestry eventually converges on a common
ancestor. The event that C first reaches a singleton set is called coalescence, and the vertex in this
singleton set represents the location of the population’s most recent common ancestor.) It follows
that C has a unique stationary distribution concentrated on the singleton subsets. In this stationary
distribution, the probability of the singleton set {i} in this stationary distribution is given by the
reproductive value pii.
4 Fixation probabilities
We now prove our main results regarding fixation probability. First, we show that the weak-
selection expansion of fixation probability has a particular form:
Theorem 1. For any fixed initial configuration ξ ∈ BNᵀ ,
ρA (ξ) = ξ̂ + δ
〈
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∆̂sel
〉◦
ξ
+O
(
δ2
)
. (22)
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Theorem 1 generalizes earlier results of Rousset (2003), Lessard and Ladret (2007), Chen
(2013), and Van Cleve (2015).
Proof. In the chain defined by Eq. (9), the expected change in the reproductive-value-weighted
frequency of A in state x is given by
∆̂ (x) =

−u
(
1− ξ̂
)
x = A,
uξ̂ x = B,
∆̂sel (x) x 6∈ {A,B} .
(23)
Averaging this expected change out over the  (ξ) distribution gives
0 = E(ξ)
[
∆̂
]
= E(ξ)
[
∆̂sel
]
− upi(ξ) (A)
(
1− ξ̂
)
+ upi(ξ) (B) ξ̂. (24)
Differentiating both sides of this equation with respect to u at u = 0, applying Eq. (11), and
rearranging, we obtain
ρA (ξ) = ξ̂ +
〈
∆̂sel
〉
ξ
. (25)
Since ∆̂◦sel (x) = 0 for every x ∈ BN, we have〈
∆̂sel
〉
ξ
= δ
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
〈
∆̂sel
〉
ξ
+O
(
δ2
)
= δ
〈
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∆̂sel
〉◦
ξ
+O
(
δ2
)
. (26)
The interchange of the 〈 〉◦ξ operator with the δ-derivative is justified by Corollary 1. Combining
this equation with Eq. (25) completes the proof.
Alternatively, Theorem 1 can be established by writing
ρA (ξ) = lim
t→∞E
[
x̂t | x0 = ξ
]
= ξ̂ +
∞
∑
t=0
E
[
x̂t+1 − x̂t | x0 = ξ
]
= ξ̂ +
∞
∑
t=0
E
[
∆̂sel
(
xt
) | x0 = ξ]
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= ξ̂ +
〈
∆̂sel
〉
ξ
. (27)
This calculation recovers Eq. (25), and the rest of the proof follows as above.
Our second main result provides a systematic way to compute the first-order term of the weak-
selection expansion, Eq. (22):
Theorem 2. For any fixed initial configuration ξ ∈ BNᵀ ,
ρA (ξ) = ξ̂ + δ
 N∑i=1pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
ηξ{i}∪I − ηξ{j}∪I
)+O (δ2) , (28)
where ηξ is the unique solution to the equations
ηξI = ξ̂ − ξI + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
ξ
α˜(I) (1 6 |I| 6 `+ 1) ; (29a)
N
∑
i=1
piiη
ξ
{i} = 0. (29b)
The term ` appearing in this system is the degree of the process under weak selection; see
Definition 1. To simplify notation, in what follows we occasionally drop the bracket notation
when using η (e.g. ηξi instead of η
ξ
{i}).
Proof. Let us define
ηξI := 〈x̂− xI〉◦ξ . (30)
From Theorem 1 and Eqs. (3) and (7), we have
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
ρA (ξ) =
〈
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
∆̂sel
〉◦
ξ
=
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
〈(
xj − xi
)
xI
〉◦
ξ
=
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
ηξ{i}∪I − ηξ{j}∪I
)
. (31)
This proves Eq. (28). Eq. (29b) follows immediately from the definition of ηI in Eq. (30). To
obtain Eq. (29a) we apply Lemma 1:
ηξI = 〈x̂− xI〉◦ξ
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= ξ̂ − ξI + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)
〈
x̂α˜ − xα˜(I)
〉◦
ξ
= ξ̂ − ξI + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)
〈
x̂− xα˜(I)
〉◦
ξ
= ξ̂ − ξI + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
ξ
α˜(I), (32)
where the penultimate line follows from the fact that x̂ is a Martingale under neutral drift.
To prove uniqueness of the solution to Eq. (29), we consider the coalescent Markov chain C
defined in the previous section. Let C be the transition matrix for C, and let p be its stationary
distribution in vector form. By uniqueness of the stationary distribution, C has a simple unit
eigenvalue, with corresponding one-dimensional left and right eigenspaces spanned by pT and 1,
respectively. We observe that Eq. (29a) can be written in the form (I− C) y = b, where y has
entries ηξI and b has entries ξ̂ − ξI . We have already exhibited a solution for y in Eq. (30); call
this solution y0. By the above remarks about C, the most general solution is y = y0 + K1 for an
arbitrary scalar K. Now we impose Eq. (29b), which can be written pTy = 0. Since pTy0 = 0
and pT1 = 1, this forces K = 0, leaving y = y0 as the unique solution.
Remark 1. For a process of degree `, calculating ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρA involves solving a linear system of size
O
(
N`+1
)
. Since the complexity of solving a linear system of n equations is O
(
n3
)
, calculating
d
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρA is O
(
N3(`+1)
)
.
Since the quantities ηI arise as the solution to a system of equations related to the coalescent
Markov chain C, it is natural to ask whether the ηI have a coalescent-theoretic interpretation. We
show in the following sections that, in some cases when the initial state is chosen from a particular
probability distribution, the ηI have a natural interpretation as coalescence times or as branch
lengths of a coalescent tree. However, these interpretations do not appear to extend to the case of
fixation from an arbitrary initial state ξ.
5 Mutant-appearance distributions
Having obtained (in Theorems 1 and 2) a weak-selection expansion for the fixation probability
from a particular state ξ, we now generalize to the case that the initial state is sampled from
a probability distribution. Specifically, we introduce the probability measures µA and µB, on
BNᵀ , to describe the state of the process after type A or B, respectively, has been introduced into
the population. We refer to µA and µB as mutant-appearance distributions, although the initial
state could just as well arise by some mechanism other than mutation (migration, experimental
manipulation, etc.). These distributions can depend on the intensity of selection, δ, and we assume
that they are differentiable at δ = 0.
Two mutant-appearance distributions often considered in evolutionary models are uniform ini-
tialization (a single mutant appears at a uniformly chosen site; Lieberman et al., 2005; Adlam
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et al., 2015) and temperature initialization (a single mutant appears at a site chosen proportionally
to the death rate di; Allen et al., 2015; Adlam et al., 2015). To define these formally, we define the
complement x of a state x ∈ BN by xi := 1− xi for i = 1, . . . ,N.
Example 1 (Uniform initialization).
µA (1i) = µB
(
1i
)
=
1
N
(1 6 i 6 N) . (33)
Example 2 (Temperature initialization).
µA (1i) =
di (B)
∑Nj=1 dj (B)
(1 6 i 6 N) ; (34a)
µB
(
1i
)
=
di (A)
∑Nj=1 dj (A)
(1 6 i 6 N) . (34b)
Unlike uniform initialization, temperature initialization opens up the possibility that the mutant-
appearance distributions depend on the intensity of selection, δ.
We call a mutant-appearance distribution symmetric if it does not distinguish between the two
types:
Definition 2. We say that µA and µB are symmetric if µA
(
ξ
)
= µB (ξ) for every ξ ∈ BNᵀ .
Uniform initialization (Example 1) gives symmetric µA and µB by definition. If mutant initial-
ization is temperature-based (Example 2), then µA and µB are symmetric when di (A) = di (B)
for i = 1, . . . ,N. This condition is obviously satisfied under neutral drift (δ = 0) but could be
violated when δ > 0.
The expected fixation probabilities for A and B, initialized according to µA and µB, respec-
tively, are
EµA [ρA] = ∑
ξ∈BNᵀ
µA (ξ) ρA (ξ) ; (35a)
EµB [ρB] = ∑
ξ′∈BNᵀ
µB
(
ξ′
)
ρB
(
ξ′
)
. (35b)
Since ρ◦A (ξ) = ξ̂ and ρ
◦
B (ξ) = 1− ξ̂ when δ = 0, we haveE◦µA [ρ◦A] = E◦µA
[
ξ̂
]
andE◦µB [ρ
◦
B] =
1−E◦µB
[
ξ̂
]
. More generally, we have EµB [ρB] = 1−EµB [ρA].
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 2, we obtain the following result for the fixation
probability of a given type from a given mutant appearance distribution:
Corollary 3. If µA is a mutant-appearance distribution for A, then
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA [ρA] =
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA
[
ξ̂
]
+
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η
µA
{i}∪I − η
µA
{j}∪I
)
, (36)
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where ηµA is the unique solution to the equations
η
µA
I = E
◦
µA
[
ξ̂ − ξI
]
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µA
α˜(I) (1 6 |I| 6 `+ 1) ; (37a)
N
∑
i=1
piiη
µA
i = 0. (37b)
Similarly, since ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
EµB [ρB] = − ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
EµB [ρA], we have
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµB [ρB] = −
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµB
[
ξ̂
]
−
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η
µB
{i}∪I − η
µB
{j}∪I
)
, (38)
where ηµB is the unique solution to the equations
η
µB
I = E
◦
µB
[
ξ̂ − ξI
]
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µB
α˜(I) (1 6 |I| 6 `+ 1) ; (39a)
N
∑
i=1
piiη
µB
i = 0. (39b)
In the case of uniform initialization (Example 1), we have EµA [ξi] = 1/N for all i ∈
{1, . . . ,N}. Combining this with Eq. (37) in the case |I| = 1, it follows that ηµAi = 0 for
each i. Furthermore, ξI = 0 for all |I| > 2. Eq. (37) then simplifies to
η
µA
I =

1
N
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µA
α˜(I) 2 6 |I| 6 `+ 1
0 |I| = 1.
(40)
In this case, ηµAI is equal to 1/N times the expected number of steps for the coalescent Markov
chain C to reach a singleton set from initial set I. In biological terms, NηµAI is the expected time
for the lineages of the individuals in set I to coalesce at a most recent common ancestor.
The overall weak-selection expansion of fixation probability, in the case of uniform initializa-
tion, becomes
EµA [ρA] =
1
N
+ δ
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η
µA
{i}∪I − η
µA
{j}∪I
)
+O
(
δ2
)
. (41)
6 Comparing fixation probabilities
When evaluating which of two competing types is favored by selection, it is common to com-
pare their fixation probabilities. Specifically, the success of A relative to B is often quantified
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Figure 2: Mutant appearance and fixation in a structured population. In the all-B state, mutants of type A appear
based on the mutant-appearance distribution µA. In the all-A state, mutants of type B appear based on µB. Once the
process transitions into a non-monomorphic state, it will eventually reach one of the two monomorphic states.
by whether EµA [ρA] > EµB [ρB] (A is favored) or EµA [ρA] < EµB [ρB] (B is favored) (Nowak
et al., 2004; Allen and Tarnita, 2014; Tarnita and Taylor, 2014). This comparison is natural when
the mutant-appearance distributions, µA and µB, are symmetric.
When µA and µB are not symmetric, however, it is less natural to compareEµA [ρA] toEµB [ρB]
directly. We therefore derive an alternative measure of success for the asymmetric case. As in Sec-
tion 3, we find it helpful to work with an amended Markov chain that possesses a unique stationary
distribution. To this end, we suppose that, from the monomorphic state B, with probability u the
next state is chosen from the distribution µA; otherwise, with probability 1− u, the state stays
B. Similarly, from the monomorphic state A, with probability u the next state is chosen from the
distribution µB; otherwise, with probability 1− u, the state stays B. The structure of this amended
Markov chain structure is depicted in Fig. 2. Provided u > 0, this process has a unique stationary
distribution. In analogy to our analysis of mutations into a fixed state in Section 3, we denote this
stationary distribution by pi(µA,µB).
We now turn to the limit of low mutation. Applying standard results on stationary distributions
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in this limit (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006, Theorem 2), we have that
lim
u→0
pi(µA,µB) (x) =

EµA [ρA]
EµA [ρA] +EµB [ρB]
x = A
EµB [ρB]
EµA [ρA] +EµB [ρB]
x = B
0 otherwise
. (42)
Intuitively, for small but positive mutation rates, the process is almost always in state A or B, with
the fraction of time spent in A converging to EµA [ρA] /
(
EµA [ρA] +EµB [ρB]
)
.
We say that weak selection favors A over B if the fraction of time spent in state A is greater
under weak selection than it is in the neutral case:
Definition 3. Weak selection favors A over B if
EµA [ρA]
EµA [ρA] +EµB [ρB]
>
E◦µA [ρ
◦
A]
E◦µA
[
ρ◦A
]
+E◦µB
[
ρ◦B
] (43)
(or, equivalently, EµA [ρA] /EµB [ρB] > E
◦
µA
[ρ◦A] /E
◦
µB
[ρ◦B]) for all sufficiently small δ > 0.
When µ◦A and µ
◦
B are symmetric (e.g. temperature or uniform initialization), we haveE
◦
µA
[ρ◦A] =
E◦µB [ρ
◦
B], and weak selection favors A relative to B if and only if EµA [ρA] > EµB [ρB] for all suf-
ficiently small δ > 0. For general mutant-appearance distributions, µA and µB, weak selection
favors A if
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA [ρA]
EµA [ρA] +EµB [ρB]
> 0. (44)
The left-hand side above has the sign of
EµB [ρB]
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA [ρA]−EµA [ρA]
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµB [ρB] . (45)
Applying Corollary 3, we obtain the condition
E◦µB [ρ
◦
B]
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA
[
ξ̂
]
+E◦µA [ρ
◦
A]
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµB
[
ξ̂
]
+
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η
µAB
{i}∪I − η
µAB
{j}∪I
)
> 0, (46)
where ηµABI := E
◦
µB
[ρ◦B] η
µA
I +E
◦
µA
[ρ◦A] η
µB
I satisfies the system of equations
η
µAB
I = E
◦
µA
[ρ◦A]
(
1−E◦µB [ξI ]
)
−E◦µB [ρ◦B]E◦µA [ξI ]
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+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µAB
α˜(I) (1 6 |I| 6 `+ 1) ; (47a)
N
∑
i=1
piiη
µAB
i = 0. (47b)
Example 3. Consider the case of fixation from a single mutant. Suppose that the initial mutant is
located at site i with probability µi in both monomorphic states A and B. That is,
µA (1i) = µB
(
1i
)
= µi (1 6 i 6 N) . (48)
All states not of the form 1i for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} have probability zero in µA, and states not of the
form 1i have probability zero in µB. Then we haveE◦µA
[
ξ{i}
]
= µi andE◦µB
[
ξ{i}
]
= 1− µi. For
non-singleton I we have E◦µA [ξI ] = 0 and E
◦
µB
[
ξ{i}
]
= 1−∑i∈I µi. We also have E◦µA [ρ◦A] =
E◦µB [ρ
◦
B] by symmetry, and both EµA
[
ξ̂
]
and EµB
[
ξ̂
]
are constant with respect to δ. In this case,
weak selection favors A if
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
16|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η
µAB
{i}∪I − η
µAB
{j}∪I
)
> 0, (49)
where the ηµABI (upon rescaling by 1/E
◦
µA
[ρ◦A]) satisfy the simplified recurrence
η
µAB
I =

∑
i∈I
µi + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µAB
α˜(I) 2 6 |I| 6 `+ 1
0 |I| = 1.
(50)
In this case, ηµABI can be understood as the expected number of mutations prior to coalescence
when starting from set I, according to the coalescent Markov chain C. In more biological terms,
η
µAB
I quantifies the total number of mutations that separate any of the individuals in I from their
most recent common ancestor.
7 Application to constant fecundity
Constant (or frequency-independent) fecundity refers to the case in which the fecundity (i.e., re-
productive rate) of an individual depends on only its type and not on the composition of the rest of
the population. A common setup has a mutant (A) of reproductive rate r > 0 competing against
a resident (B) of reproductive rate 1 (Lieberman et al., 2005; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2008; Broom
et al., 2011; Voorhees, 2013; Monk et al., 2014; Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015; Kaveh et al., 2015;
Cuesta et al., 2017; Pavlogiannis et al., 2018; Mo¨ller et al., 2019; Tkadlec et al., 2019). The fix-
ation probability of the mutant type is then a function of r; we can write this as ρA (r; ξ), where
ξ ∈ BNᵀ is the initial configuration of the mutant and resident.
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A common feature of these models is that the fecundity is interpreted in a relative sense, mean-
ing that r quantifies the reproductive rate of A relative to B. Consequently, the fixation probabilities
of both types are invariant under rescaling the reproductive rates of all individuals. In particular,
the fixation probability of a mutant of reproductive rate r competing against a resident of repro-
ductive rate 1 is equal (upon dividing by r) to the fixation probability of a mutant of reproductive
rate 1 competing against a resident of reproductive rate r−1. By interchanging the roles of A and
B, we see that fixation probabilities satisfy the duality
ρA (r; ξ) = 1− ρA
(
r−1; ξ
)
. (51)
For r close to 1, meaning that the mutation has only a small effect on fecundity, the fixation
probability can be analyzed using weak-selection methods such as those considered here (Allen
et al., 2020). To apply these methods, we define the mutant’s selection coefficient as s = r − 1.
We then obtain an expansion of the fixation probability, ρA (1+ s; ξ), around s = 0. The selection
coefficient s plays a similar role to the selection intensity δ in the foregoing sections, except that s
can be negative, indicating a disadvantageous mutant.
Taking the s-derivative of both sides of Eq. (51) at s = 0, it follows that
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
ρA (1+ s; ξ) =
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
ρA
(
1+ s; ξ
)
=
1
2
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
(
ρA (1+ s; ξ) + ρA
(
1+ s; ξ
))
. (52)
Applying Theorem 2 (with s in place of δ), we have the following weak-selection expansion for
ρA:
ρA (1+ s; ξ) = ξ̂ +
s
2
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η˜ξ{i}∪I − η˜ξ{j}∪I
)
+O
(
s2
)
, (53)
where η˜ξI := η
ξ
I + η
ξ
I . These η˜
ξ
I are the unique solution to the recurrence
η˜ξI =
1−
(
ξI + ξ I
)
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η˜
ξ
α˜(I) 2 6 |I| 6 `+ 1
0 |I| = 1.
(54)
Note that ξI + ξ I is equal to 1 if all individuals in I have the same type in ξ (i.e. ξi = ξ j for all
i, j ∈ I) and 0 otherwise. In particular, ξi + ξ i = 1 for all i = 1, . . . ,N, which is why η˜ξI = 0 for|I| = 1.
If the initial state ξ is drawn from a mutant-appearance distribution, µA, we then have
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
EµA [ρA] =
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
EµA
[
ξ̂
]
+
1
2
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η˜
µA
{i}∪I − η˜
µA
{j}∪I
)
(55)
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η˜
µA
I =
1−EµA
[
ξI + ξ I
]
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η˜
µA
α˜(I) 2 6 |I| 6 `+ 1
0 |I| = 1.
(56)
In particular, for the mutant-appearance distribution in Example 3, in which the initial state has a
single mutant whose location i is chosen with probability µi (independent of r), we have
EµA [ρA] =
N
∑
i=1
piiµi +
s
2
N
∑
i=1
pii
N
∑
j=1
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
06|I|6`ji
cjiI
(
η˜
µA
{i}∪I − η˜
µA
{j}∪I
)
+O
(
s2
)
, (57)
where
η˜
µA
I =
∑i∈I µi + ∑(R,α) p
◦
(R,α)η˜
µA
α˜(I) 2 6 |I| 6 `+ 1
0 |I| = 1.
(58)
Eq. (58) is identical to the recurrence for ηµAI in Eq. (50). Therefore, in this case, the η˜
µA
I can also
be interpreted as the expected number of mutations in the coalescent tree of the individuals in I.
7.1 Constant fecundity on graphs
Let us now suppose that the population structure is represented by an undirected, unweighted
graph. Each vertex is occupied by one individual. As above, we consider a mutant type, A, of fe-
cundity r = 1+ s, competing against a resident type, B, of fecundity 1. A robust research program
aims to elucidate the effects of graph structure on the mutant’s fixation probability (Lieberman
et al., 2005; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2008; Broom et al., 2011; Voorhees, 2013; Monk et al., 2014;
Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015; Kaveh et al., 2015; Cuesta et al., 2017; Pavlogiannis et al., 2018;
Mo¨ller et al., 2019; Tkadlec et al., 2019).
The edge weight between vertices i and j is denoted wij (= wji). We define the weighted degree
of vertex i as wi := ∑Nj=1 wij. The random walk step probability from i to j is pij := wij/wi.
7.1.1 death-Birth updating
Under the death-Birth process (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015; Allen et al.,
2020; Tkadlec et al., 2020), an individual is first chosen, uniformly-at-random from the population,
to be replaced (“death”). A neighbor is then chosen, with probability proportional to the product
of edge weight and fecundity, to produce an offspring that fills the vacancy (“Birth”). The term
“Birth” is capitalized here to emphasize the fact that selection influences this step (Hindersin and
Traulsen, 2015).
For this process, the probability that the offspring of i replaces the occupant of j is
eij (1+ s; x) =
1
N
wij ((1+ s) xi + 1− xi)
∑Nk=1 wjk ((1+ s) xk + 1− xk)
=
pji
N
1+ sxi
1+ s∑Nk=1 pjkxk
. (59)
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Differentiating this expression with respect to s at s = 0 gives
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
eij (1+ s; x) =
N
∑
k=1
cijk xk, (60)
where
cijk =

pji
N
(
1− pji
)
k = i,
− pji
N
pjk otherwise.
(61)
This process therefore has degree ` = 1.
Under neutral drift, e◦ij = pji/N, and solving Eq. (6) yields the reproductive value of vertex i
for death-Birth as pii = wi/∑Nj=1 wj (see also Maciejewski, 2014; Allen et al., 2017; Allen and
McAvoy, 2019). Simplifying Eq. (53) using the reversibility property piipij = pijpji, we obtain the
weak-selection fixation probability from an arbitrary starting configuration ξ:
ρA (1+ s; ξ) = ξ̂ +
s
2N
N
∑
i,j=1
piip
(2)
ij η˜
µA
ij +O
(
s2
)
, (62)
where the η˜ξij are the unique solution to the recurrence
η˜ξij =

N
2
(
ξi + ξ j − 2ξiξ j
)
+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
(
pikη˜
µA
kj + pjkη˜
µA
ik
)
i 6= j,
0 i = j.
(63)
For a single mutant initialized randomly as in Example 3, Eq. (57) becomes
EµA [ρA] =
N
∑
i=1
piiµi +
s
2N
N
∑
i,j=1
piip
(2)
ij η˜
µA
ij +O
(
s2
)
, (64)
with
η˜
µA
ij =
N
(
µi + µj
2
)
+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
(
pikη˜
µA
kj + pjkη˜
µA
ik
)
i 6= j
0 i = j.
(65)
Eqs. (64) and (65) generalize a result of Allen et al. (2020), which pertained to the case of uniform
initialization, i.e. µi = 1/N for all i.
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7.1.2 Birth-death updating
In the Birth-death process (Lieberman et al., 2005; Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015), also known as
the invasion process (Antal et al., 2006), an individual i is selected to reproduce with probability
proportional to fecundity; the offspring of i replaces j with probability pij.
Letting |x| := ∑Ni=1 xi denote the abundance of type A in state x, the probability that i replaces
j in this state is
eij (1+ s; x) =
(1+ s) xi + 1− xi
∑Nk=1 ((1+ s) xk + 1− xk)
pij =
1+ sxi
N + s |x| pij. (66)
Differentiating this expression with respect to δ at δ = 0 gives
d
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
eij (1+ s; x) =
N
∑
k=1
cijk xk, (67)
with
cijk =

N − 1
N2
pij k = i,
− 1
N2
pij otherwise.
(68)
For neutral drift, e◦ij = pij/N, and Eq. (6) yields a reproductive value of pii = w
−1
i /∑
N
j=1 w
−1
j for
Birth-death (see also Maciejewski, 2014; Allen et al., 2017; Allen and McAvoy, 2019). Simplifying
Eq. (53) using the relation piipji = pijpij, we obtain the weak-selection fixation probability from
an arbitrary initial state ξ:
ρA(1+ s) = ξ̂ +
s
2N
N
∑
i,j=1
piipjiη˜
µA
ij +O
(
s2
)
, (69)
where the η˜ξij are the unique solution to
η˜ξij =

N
(
ξi + ξ j − 2ξiξ j
)
+∑Nk=1
(
pkiη˜
µA
kj + pkjη˜
µA
ik
)
∑Nk=1
(
pki + pkj
) i 6= j,
0 i = j.
(70)
For the mutant-appearance distribution of Example 3, Eq. (57) simplifies to
EµA [ρA] =
N
∑
i=1
piiµi +
s
2N
N
∑
i,j=1
piipjiη˜
µA
ij +O
(
s2
)
, (71)
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with
η˜ξij =

N
(
µi + µj
)
+∑Nk=1
(
pkiη˜
µA
kj + pkjη˜
µA
ik
)
∑Nk=1
(
pki + pkj
) i 6= j,
0 i = j.
(72)
8 Application to evolutionary game theory
We now move from constant fecundity to evolutionary games (frequency-dependent fecundity)
in structured populations (Blume, 1993; Nowak and May, 1992; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabo´ and
Fa´th, 2007; Nowak et al., 2009). In this setting, individuals interact with one another and receive
a net payoff based on the types (strategies) of those they interact with. In state x ∈ BN, we let
ui (x) denote the payoff (or utility) of player i. This payoff is converted into relative fecundity,
Fi, by letting Fi (x) = exp {δui (x)}, where δ > 0 is the selection intensity parameter. (An
alternative convention, Fi (x) = 1+ δui (x), is equivalent under weak selection, since both have
Fi (x) = 1 + δui(x) + O
(
δ2
)
.) The replacement rule then depends directly on the fecundity
vector, F ∈ (0,∞)N, i.e. eij (x) = eij (F (x)). Under weak selection, there is no loss of generality
in assuming that the state-to-fecundity mapping, x 7→ F (x), is deterministic (see McAvoy et al.,
2020). Therefore, for every i, j = 1, . . . ,N, we can write
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
eij (x) =
N
∑
k=1
(
d
dFk
∣∣∣∣∣
F=1
eij (F)
)
uk (x) . (73)
Since the fecundity derivative ddFk
∣∣∣
F=1
eij (F) does not depend on x, the degree of the process under
weak selection is controlled by the utility functions {ui (x)}Ni=1. Let mijk := ddFk
∣∣∣
F=1
eij (F) be
the marginal effect of the fecundity of k on i replacing j (McAvoy et al., 2020), and suppose that
individual k’s payoff is uk (x) = ∑I⊆{1,...,N} pkIxI . We then have
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
eij (x) =
N
∑
k=1
mijk uk (x) = ∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
(
N
∑
k=1
mijk p
k
I
)
xI , (74)
which, by the uniqueness of the representation of Eq. (3), gives cijI = ∑
N
k=1m
ij
k p
k
I . Therefore,
generically, the degree of the process coincides with the maximal degree of the payoff functions
when each payoff function is viewed as a multi-linear polynomial in x1, . . . , xN (see also Ohtsuki,
2014; McAvoy and Hauert, 2016).
8.1 Additive games
Additive games are a special class of games for which the conditions to be favored by selection
can be written in a simplified form. An evolutionary game is additive if its payoff function, ui (x),
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is of degree one (linear) in x for every i = 1, . . . ,N. In this case we can write
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
eij (x) = c
ij
0 +
N
∑
k=1
cijk xk (75)
for some collection of constants cijk with i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. If we further assume that the all-B
state has the same replacement probabilities as the neutral process—that is, p(R,α)(B) = p◦(R,α) for
all (R, α) and all δ > 0—it then follows that cij0 = 0 for all i, j. In this case, Theorem 2 gives
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA [ρA] =
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
EµA
[
ξ̂
]
+
N
∑
i,j,k=1
piic
ji
k
(
η
µA
ik − η
µA
jk
)
, (76)
where the ηµAij are the unique solution to the equations
η
µA
ij = E
◦
µA
[
ξ̂ − ξiξ j
]
+ ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µA
α˜(i)α˜(j) (1 6 i, j 6 N) ; (77a)
N
∑
i=1
piiη
µA
ii = 0. (77b)
Let us now consider the mutant-appearance distributions of Example 3; i.e. a single mutant
appears at site i with probability µi. The weak-selection fixation probability of A can then be
calculated as
EµA [ρA] =
N
∑
i=1
piiµi + δ
N
∑
i,j,k=1
piic
ji
k
(
η
µA
ik − η
µA
jk
)
+O
(
δ2
)
, (78)
with ηµAij as above. Furthermore, the condition for weak selection to favor A, Eq. (49), becomes
N
∑
i,j,k=1
piic
ji
k
(
η
µAB
ik − η
µAB
jk
)
> 0, (79)
where the ηµABij are the unique solution to
η
µAB
ij =

µi + µj + ∑
(R,α)
p◦(R,α)η
µAB
α˜(i)α˜(j) i 6= j,
0 i = j.
(80)
8.2 Graph-structured populations with death-Birth updating
Evolutionary games on a graphs are a well-known model for social interactions in structured popu-
lations (Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007;
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Santos et al., 2008; Chen, 2013; De´barre et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2017, 2019; McAvoy et al.,
2020). As in Section 7.1, we suppose that the population structure is represented by a weighted,
undirected graph with adjacency matrix
(
wij
)N
i,j=1. We adopt the notation of Section 7.1 for the
weighed degree wi := ∑j wij and the step probability pij := wij/wi.
As in Section 7.1.1, we consider death-Birth updating: an individual is chosen uniformly at
random for death, and then a neighboring individual is chosen proportional to (fecundity × edge
weight) to reproduce into the vacancy. With this update rule, the marginal probability that i trans-
mits an offspring to j is
eij (x) =
1
N
Fi (x)wij
∑N`=1 F` (x)w`j
. (81)
Differentiating with respect to δ at δ = 0 gives
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
eij (x) =
1
N
ui (x)wijwj − wij ∑N`=1 u` (x)w`j
w2j
=
pji
N
(
ui(x)−
N
∑
`=1
pj`u`(x)
)
. (82)
We now focus on a particular game called the donation game (Sigmund, 2010), in which type
A pays a cost of c to donate b to every neighbor; type B donates nothing and pays no cost. For
b > c > 0, this is a special case of the prisoner’s dilemma, with A playing the role of cooperators
and B playing the role of defectors.
There are two conventions for aggregating the payoffs received from these game interactions
(Maciejewski et al., 2014). The first is to take the edge-weighted sum of the payoffs received from
all others; this is called accumulated payoffs, and leads to ui (x) = −wicxi +∑Nk=1 wikbxk. The
second is to take the edge-weighted average (i.e. to normalize the sum by the weighted degree);
this is called accumulated payoffs and leads to ui (x) = −cxi + b∑Nk=1 pikxk. In either case, the
game is additive according to the definition of the previous subsection.
Substituting the respective payoff functions into Eq. (82) yields
d
dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=0
eij (x) =
N
∑
k=1
cijk xk, (83)
with
cijk =

pji
N
(
−c
(
p(0)ik − p(1)jk
)
+ b
(
p(1)ik − p(2)jk
))
(averaged)
pji
N
(
−c
(
p(0)ik wi − pjkwk
)
+ b
(
wik −
N
∑
`=1
pj`w`k
))
(accumulated)
(84)
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Above, we have used p(n)ij to denote the probability that an n-step random walk from i terminates
at j; note in particular that p(0)ij equals 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
For an arbitrary initial configuration ξ ∈ BNᵀ , Theorem 2 gives
ρA (ξ) = ξ̂ + δ
N
∑
i,j,k=1
piic
ji
k
(
ηξik − ηξjk
)
+O
(
δ2
)
. (85)
Where the ηξij are the unique solution to
ηξij =
N
2
(
ξ̂ − ξiξ j
)
+
1
2
N
∑
k=1
(
pikη
ξ
kj + pjkη
ξ
ik
)
(i 6= j) (86a)
ηξii = N
(
ξˆ − ξi
)
+
N
∑
j=1
pijη
ξ
jj (86b)
N
∑
i=1
piiη
ξ
ii = 0. (86c)
In the case of averaged payoffs, we can obtain a particularly elegant expression for the weak-
selection expansion of fixation probability. Let ηξ
(n) := ∑
N
i,j=1 piip
(n)
ij η
ξ
ij denote the expectation of
ηξij when i and j are sampled from the two ends of a stationary n-step random walk, n > 0. We
note that ηξ
(0) = ∑
N
i=1 piiη
ξ
ii = 0 by Eq. (86c). Substituting from Eq. (84) and simplifying using
the reversibility property piip
(n)
ij = pijp
(n)
ji , we obtain
ρA (ξ) = ξ̂ +
δ
N
(
−cηξ
(2) + b
(
ηξ
(3) − ηξ(1)
))
+O
(
δ2
)
. (87)
This provides the fixation probability of cooperators in the donation game, under weak selection,
for any given starting configuration ξ. Eq. (87) generalizes one of the main results of Allen et al.
(2017) (who considered only uniform initialization) to the case of an arbitrary initial state.
For accumulated payoffs, the corresponding expression is
ρA (ξ) = ξ̂ +
δ
N
(
−c
N
∑
i,j=1
pii
(
p(2)ij − p(0)ij
)
wjη
ξ
ij
+b
N
∑
i,j,k=1
pii
(
p(2)ij − p(0)ij
)
wjkη
ξ
ik
)
+O
(
δ2
)
. (88)
8.2.1 Homogeneous (regular) graphs
In the case of a regular graph, we can obtain the weak-selection fixation probability in closed form.
Suppose the graph is unweighted (meaning each edge weight is either 0 or 1), has no self-loops
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(wii = 0 for each i) and is regular of degree d (wi = d for all i). For regular graphs, accumulated
and averaged payoffs are equivalent upon rescaling by all payoffs by a factor of d; we will consider
averaged payoffs here.
Noting that pii = 1/N for all i, and ξ̂ = |ξ|/N, for regular graphs, Eq. (86) for ηξij can be
written as
ηξij =
1
2
(|ξ| − Nξiξ j)+ 12 N∑k=1
(
pikη
ξ
kj + pjkη
ξ
ik
)
(89a)
+
δij
2
(
|ξ| − Nξi + 2
N
∑
k=1
pik
(
ηξkk − ηξik
))
,
N
∑
i=1
ηξii = 0, (89b)
where δij is the Kronecker delta function. Multiplying by 1N p
(n)
ij and summing over i and j leads
to a recurrence relation for ηξ
(n):
ηξ
(n+1) − ηξ(n) =
1
2
N
∑
i,j=1
p(n)ij ξiξ j −
1
2
|ξ|
+
1
2N
N
∑
i=1
p(n)ii
(
Nξi − |ξ|+ 2
N
∑
k=1
pik
(
ηξik − ηξkk
))
. (90)
We now let n → ∞, taking a running average in the case that the random walk is periodic. In this
limit, p(n)ij converges to pij = 1/N for each i and j. Simplifying and applying Eq. (89b), Eq. (90)
then becomes
0 =
1
2N
N
∑
i,j=1
ξiξ j − 12 |ξ|+
1
2N2
N
∑
i=1
(Nξi − |ξ|) + 1N
(
N
∑
i,k=1
pikη
ξ
ik −
N
∑
k=1
ηξkk
)
=
1
2N
|ξ|2 − 1
2
|ξ|+ 1
N
ηξ
(1). (91)
This leads to
ηξ
(1) =
1
2
|ξ| (N − |ξ|) . (92)
Applying Eq. (90), and noting that p(2)ii = 1/d for each i, we have
ηξ
(2) =
1
2
(
|ξ| (N − |ξ| − 1) +
N
∑
i,j=1
p(1)ij ξiξ j
)
, (93a)
ηξ
(3) =
1
2
(
|ξ|
(
d+ 1
d
(N − |ξ|)− 2
)
+
N
∑
i,j=1
(
p(1)ij + p
(2)
ij
)
ξiξ j
)
. (93b)
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Substituting into Eq. (87), we find the following closed-form expression for the weak-selection
fixation probability from an arbitrary initial configuration:
ρA (ξ) =
|ξ|
N
+
δ
2N
(
−c
(
|ξ| (N − |ξ| − 1) +
N
∑
i,j=1
p(1)ij ξiξ j
)
+b
(
|ξ|
(
N − |ξ|
d
− 2
)
+
N
∑
i,j=1
(
p(1)ij + p
(2)
ij
)
ξiξ j
))
+O
(
δ2
)
. (94)
This is equivalent to the main result of Chen et al. (2016). In particular, when the initial state con-
tains only a single type A individual, we have |ξ| = 1, ∑Ni,j=1 p(1)ij ξiξ j = 0, and ∑Ni,j=1 p(1)ij ξiξ j =
∑Ni=1 p
(2)
ii ξi = 1/d, leading to
ρA (ξ) =
1
N
+
δ
2N
(
−c (N − 2) + b
(
N
d
− 2
))
+O
(
δ2
)
. (95)
This result holds regardless of which vertex contains the initial type A individual.
8.3 Comparing population structures
A large body of literature is devoted to the question of whether—and to what extent—population
structure can promote the evolution of cooperation (Nowak and May, 1992; Hauert and Doebeli,
2004; Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2008;
Nowak et al., 2009; Tarnita et al., 2009; De´barre et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2017). The donation
game with b > c > 0 provides an elegant model for studying this question (Sigmund, 2010):
Type A (representing cooperation) pays cost c to give benefit b to its partners; type B pays no
costs and gives no benefits. Population structures can then be compared according to whether or
not they increase A’s chance of becoming fixed, depending on the benefit, b, and cost, c. Each
population structure has a “critical benefit-to-cost ratio” (b/c)∗ such that weak selection increases
A’s fixation probability if and only if (b/c)∗ > 0 and b/c > (b/c)∗ (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Nowak
et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2017).
A lower critical benefit-to-cost can then be interpreted as “better for the evolution of coopera-
tion” (Nathanson et al., 2009). Such quantities have also been used to formally order population
structures. For example, Pen˜a et al. (2016) state that “two different models of spatial structure and
associated evolutionary dynamics can be unambiguously compared by ranking their relatedness or
structure coefficients: the greater the coefficient, the less stringent the conditions for cooperation
to evolve. Hence, different models of population structure can be ordered by their potential to
promote the evolution of cooperation in a straightforward way.” While there is indeed an unam-
biguous comparison of population structures based on critical benefit-to-cost ratios, a comparison
based on which is “better for the evolution of cooperation” is more subtle.
Consider the donation game with accumulated payoffs on a graph, with death-Birth updating
and uniform mutant-appearance distribution. By Eq. (88),
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Eunif [ρA] =
1
N
+
δ
N
(
−c
N
∑
i,j=1
piip
(2)
ij wjη
unif
ij
+b
N
∑
i,j,k=1
pii
(
p(2)ij − p(0)ij
)
wjkηunifik
)
+O
(
δ2
)
, (96)
with
ηunifij =

1/2
(
1+
N
∑
k=1
(
pikηunifkj + pjkη
unif
ki
))
i 6= j
0 i = j.
(97)
The critical benefit-to-cost ratio is(
b
c
)∗
=
∑Ni,j=1 piip
(2)
ij wjη
unif
ij
∑Ni,j,k=1 pii
(
p(2)ij − p(0)ij
)
wjkηunifik
(98)
In Fig. 3, we apply this result to first compute the critical benefit-to-cost ratios for two heteroge-
neous population structures of size N = 50. Specifically, we give examples of graphs Γ1 (Fig. 3A)
and Γ2 (Fig. 3B) such that 0 < (b/c)∗Γ1 < (b/c)
∗
Γ2 , which means that the condition for cooperation
to be favored on Γ1 is less strict than that of Γ2. However, this not imply that Γ1 is unambiguously
better for the evolution of cooperation than Γ2. For example, when b = 10 and c = 1, which
corresponds to b/c > (b/c)∗Γ1 , (b/c)
∗
Γ2 , weak selection boosts the fixation probability of cooper-
ators on Γ2 more than it does on Γ1. Therefore, for this particular cooperative social dilemma, Γ2
is better for the evolution of cooperation than Γ1. It follows that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
provides only part of the story when comparing two population structures based on their abilities
to support the emergence of cooperation.
9 Discussion
Here we have analyzed the fixation probability of a mutant type under weak selection, for a broad
class of evolutionary models and arbitrary initial conditions. The main result, Theorem 2, gives
a first-order expansion of fixation probability, ρA (ξ), in the selection intensity δ, for any initial
configuration, ξ. This expansion has three main ingredients: (i) reproductive value, pii, which
quantifies the expected contribution of i to future generations; (ii) coefficients, cijI , of first-order
effects of the probability that i replaces j in one update step; and (iii) neutral sojourn times, ηξI ,
which may be interpreted in terms of the mean number of steps in which all individuals in I have
type A prior to absorption, given that the initial state of the population is ξ.
It follows from Theorem 2 that the complexity of calculating this first-order expansion is
O
(
N3(`+1)
)
, where ` is the degree of the process. Actually, by the work of Le Gall (2012), this
complexity is (in theory) O
(
N2.373(`+1)
)
. This bound can be further improved in some cases by
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𝑏/𝑐 ∗ ≈ 2.2334*++, -./𝔼1234 𝜌6 ≈ 2.3661𝑏 = 10, 𝑐 = 1 𝑏 = 10, 𝑐 = 1
𝑏/𝑐 ∗ ≈ 3.0322*++, -./𝔼1234 𝜌6 ≈ 2.6854
A B
Figure 3: Two heterogeneous population structures under death-Birth updating. The population structure depicted in
B is unequivocally better for the evolution of cooperation than that of A when b = 10 and c = 1 because selection
results in a greater improvement to a rare cooperator’s fixation probability. This result holds despite the fact that the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio of B is greater than it is for A, which means that the condition under which cooperators
can thrive on B is stricter than that of A. It follows that a comparison between population structures based on which
one is better for the evolution of cooperation cannot be made based on the critical ratios alone.
31
taking into account structural properties of the population, as we observed in the case of death-Birth
updating on a regular graph. In any case, for fixed degree `, the system size exhibits polynomial
growth in N, whereas the number of states in the evolutionary process grows exponentially in N.
The neutral sojourn times, ηξI and variants thereof, play a central role in our method. Their
interpretation is therefore a question of interest. From Eq. (30), we can see that −ηξI = 〈xI − x̂〉◦ξ
is a measure of the tendency for all individuals in I have type A, under neutral drift from initial
state ξ. In the case of a uniform initial distribution µA (Example 1), η
µA
I is proportional to the
expected time for the coalescent process C to reach a singleton set (coalesce) starting from set I. In
a number of other cases—see Eqs. (50), (58), and (80)—the relevant values of η can be interpreted
as expected numbers of mutations prior to coalescence. In the most general case, however, it is
unclear whether there is a natural coalescent-theoretic interpretation. The question of how the η
quantities connect to other quantities of biological relevance merits further investigation.
The utility of our framework is illustrated by the application to evolutionary dynamics on
graphs in Sections 7 and 8. In particular, Eqs. (86)–(88) provide the weak-selection expansion
of fixation probability for the donation game with arbitrary graph and initial configuration. This
unifies and generalizes the main results of Chen et al. (2016) (who considered only regular graphs)
as well as Allen et al. (2017) (who considered only uniform initialization).
From these results, one can derive many of the well-known results on critical benefit-to-cost
ratios for cooperation to be favored in social dilemmas (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007;
Chen, 2013; Allen and Nowak, 2014; Fotouhi et al., 2018). Moreover, they provide more informa-
tion than just when weak selection favors a particular trait; they also determine how much, based
on the magnitude of ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρA, which can lead to more nuanced comparisons of population struc-
tures based on their ability to promote a trait (Section 8.3). The magnitude of ddδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
ρA has been
explored considerably less than its sign, and our results allow this question to be explored for quite
a large class of evolutionary update rules, population structures, and initial configurations.
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